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Home-sales trends took a step down today. The National Association of Realtors released their monthly home-sales data, and on the face of it, all metrics seem to have declined. But a closer inspection of the release suggests a bifurcation between improving conditions in the Northeast and stagnant to declining conditions in the South and West.

Laurence Yun, the chief economist at NAR, would blame it on the weather and suggest that “some closings were simply postponed by winter storms,” but this was most likely not the case. The Northeast and Midwest, which were both hit heavily by winter storms, also displayed strength and improved from January to February. The South and West, however, neither of which were impacted nearly as much, weighed heavily on the data.

Year over year, the sales-pace increased 7%, but the SAAR declined from January to February, 2010. The declining sales-pace yielded an increase in total housing inventory at the end of February of 9.5% to 3.59m existing homes available for sale, an 8.6 month supply at the current pace, up from a 7.8 month supply in January. Sales-patterns in the Southern and Western regions masked the nascent improvements in the Northeast (up 2.4% MoM, 12% YoY) and Midwest (up 2.8% MoM, 8.8% YoY).

Blaming February’s conditions on the weather belies the possible emergence of two very different real estate markets. First, an area of stabilization and recovery that may be developing in the Northeast and Midwest. And second, regions saddled with the left-overs of a housing boon that made states such as Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, and Florida the poster-children for housing speculation and inventory excesses. The division, however, would not be particularly surprising. Afterall, isn’t NAR also always trying to send the message: all real estate is local.

Although sales have been higher than year-ago levels for eight straight months and home prices are much more stable compared to the past few years, the housing recovery is fragile at the moment…Some closings were simply postponed by winter storms, but buyers couldn’t get out to look at homes in some areas and that should negatively impact near-term contract activity.

Lawrence Yun, Chief Economist, National Association of Realtors: via monthly NAR release.

Each firm has lost business in, and has reduced investment in and output of United States equity research as a result of the free riding by Fly and other services. This is a bread-and-butter case of hot-news appropriation.

Benjamin Marks to US District Judge Denise Cote: via Bloomberg.

The case of Barclays v. Theflyonthewall.com provides a recent test of the hot news doctrine in the investment research industry. Claims that Fly on the Wall was just reporting the news from the free marketplace of ideas would not protect them. Instead, Judge Denise Cote’s findings of facts and conclusions of law following the March 8-11 bench trial would institute an injunction that embargoed recent headlines and materials from the plaintiffs from publication by Fly on the Wall. The news of her decision has lathered the industry into froth over whether Thomson/Reuters and Bloomberg may be next. But its application may be greater than that. Though the opinion ruled in an industry that is traditionally seen as different than the news industry – investment research – can its application in the broader news industry be far behind? Read the rest of this entry »

this push towards things becoming more open is probably the most powerful and transformative social change… We may be the company that really leads this movement….It’s not clear that anyone else is going to manage it correctly.

Mark Zuckerberg, outlining the steady erosion of the concept of privacy in our time: WSJ

Jessica Vascellaro’s cover-story in the WSJ seats Facebook in a tension between going public and Zuckerberg’s remarkable ability to “delay gratification” and take a seat in “a long queue of tech barons with grand ambitions.” The real story, however, may be in her subtle jibes at one who might become “world’s richest twenty-something.” More than a thinly veiled personal attack, Vascellaro may be hinting at something more substantial: that the question of privacy in the 21st century will be meaningfully shaped by an ambiguous and controlling figure. Read the rest of this entry »

Intellectual Ventures wants to define itself before someone else does. It’s been called a troll, a renegade, just another stop on shakedown street. Now, however, Nathan Myhrvold has launched a round of publicity that includes batteries from the New York Times (blogarticle) and a single shot from the Harvard Business Review. Myrhvold would have his readers believe that we are standing on the edge of a capital market for invention that will unleash and remunerate the full creative power of our economy, and Intelligent Ventures is just the firm to launch it.

Sometimes, however, a troll is just a troll. But Myhrvold is right. He’s not just a troll. Myhrvold’s ambition is greater than that. He’s planning an intellectual property cartel, and policy makers would be well-advised to monitor his project.

Myhrvold had the good fortune to work closely with Steve Lohr of the New York Times to publicize his manifesto in the HBR and share his vision. Lohr provides a patient and adulating witness to the quirky polymath. With an enterprise so shrouded in secrecy, Lohr understands that Myhrvold won’t just speak with anyone and chooses to reserve judgment and ingratiate himself with him: “white hat or black hat, Intellectual Ventures is growing rapidly and becoming a major force in the marketplace.” Lohr goes further, however, and instills the underdog spirit in Myhrvold, who exclaims, “We have to be successful,” following which Lohr warns us that the “issues surrounding Intellectual Ventures, viewed broadly, are the ground rules and incentives for innovation.” Josh Lerner, an HBS economist and patent expert, speaks up in the next sentence and says, “how this plays out will be crucial to the American economy.” Could Myrhvold’s success possibly be tied to answering crucial questions about the ground rules and incentives for innovation in the American economy? Lohr’s thoughtful organization might have you think so, and Lerner’s quote would seemingly substantiate it.

Maybe Lohr was uncomfortable with the persona he had attributed to Myhrvold, for he would couple his article with an early-morning blog post on Bits. While his print subscribers drank deeply of his David & Goliath – styled allegory on patent-law, he quietly published a clarification of the patent litigation dilemma. Lohr frames the next phase of IV in terms of solving the free-rider problem. The label is interesting for two reasons. First, it implicitly says what it is not. For example, it is not greenmail, as Jim Huston, a former licensing and patent executive at Intel, suggested in a 2006 Business Week interview: “If you don’t invest, you’re our No. 1 target.” Second, it suggests that there must be a simple solution to an unacceptable practice. Afterall, we’ve all heard about free-riders.

Intellectual Venture’s limited partners invested to protect themselves from trolls. If Intellectual Ventures can buy up loose patents, then the LPs have a quasi-insurance policy against trolls, who could just as easily, though more threateningly, buy those patents. Myrhvold initially called it a defense fund, almost a patent poolMore money means more insurance, but there’s a quirk. It may require litigation to work.

Though litigation may make Intellectual Ventures look like a troll, be assured, it’s not. Myhrvold claims to have only a reluctant interest in litigation. “It’s a stupid and inefficient way to resolve disputes, but in a polarized world, there will be litigation,” claims Myhrvold. It’s necessary, however, to solve the free rider problem. Some people have paid into the defense fund, others haven’t. IV’s hands are tied. They have to sue, so they can protect the interests of their initial investors. It’s their fiduciary duty.

The solution: bring new members into the Intellectual Ventures project. Litigation, or the threat of litigation, Myhrvold believes, will encourage others to join. As they join, he can manage the free rider problem and assure appropriate and legal access to the trove of intellectual property already collected, thus demonstrating the value of their initial investors’ decision to work with them, while creating a market for invention capital – a market for eureka.  “Our licensing task is to go from dozens of companies to thousands,” says Myhrvold.

Myhrvold’s vision would solve the free-rider problem, but it does not mean Intellectual Ventures is not a troll. Lohr mistakenly considers the free-rider problem in isolation. Intellectual Ventures does not have a free-rider problem in the vein of a public good. It’s not the case of a shipping association that has financed and constructed a lighthouse for their benefit, but may inadvertently serve that of the brigands, castaways and competitors who happen along. Lohr’s free-rider problem exists only because Intellectual Ventures has organized a Non-Practicing Entity to collect intellectual property with the intention of monetizing it for their limited partners. The free-rider problem in this case is that which is exploited by a troll.

It wouldn’t be wrong to just say troll, but Intellectual Ventures seems to be more than that. Myhrvold’s proposal would create a troll quite unlike anything that we have seen before – a troll with a cartel-twist: an intellectual property cartel. With “thousands of members” Myrhvold would have an agreement among competing firms to coordinate prices on a vast holding of intellectual property to the disadvantage of non-members. Patents are monopolies, so non-members will have no substitutes. Its alarming size would give it substantial reach in the intellectual property market and engender a network-effect, which would cultivate market power and make membership more valuable on a per-patent-basis as it grows. The problem with this isn’t the idea of patents. The problem is the power that an intellectual property cartel would have.

Intellectual Ventures would increasingly intersect with the interests and inventions of others. When it would, it would find itself better capitalized and equipped to pursue a claim. With growing resources, Intellectual Ventures would be able to take more risks with litigation, actual or threatened. A claim, for example, may be weak, but their credible ability to marshal legal action may force concessions and settlements where none may be merited. Because of the network-effect and the lack of substitutes, settlements and membership will become more costly on a per-patent basis. Moreover, with imperfect information on the scope and character of Intellectual Ventures’ holdings, it may only take a well-phrased bluff to induce a target into membership.

What happens in this model? What is the consequence of an intellectual property cartel? It raises the price of innovation. It puts smaller firms at a disadvantage. And it places us in a world where Non-Practicing Entities can lay in wait, as a hunter in a blind, lash out without warning and stifle the work of companies that may actually be organized to accomplish something, such as provide goods or services, with their efforts. Patents aren’t bad, but these outcomes are.

—part of the quotestream around IV

If I appear to be a total milquetoast and I say I’ll never [sue], then people will rip me off totally…I say, ‘I can’t afford to sue you on all of these, and you can’t afford to defend on all these.’

Nathan Myhrvold: WSJ 2008

You have a set of people who are used to getting something for free, and they are some of the wealthiest companies on earth. I was there. I was in the meetings. This is they way this business thinks about it.

Today invention is an area that people view as too illiquid, too uncertain, and too risky, so that nobody wants to invest in it. The world has shown that if you provide capital and expertise to an area that is starved for capital and expertise.

Nathan Myhrvold, on corporate respect for patents, BW 2006. Izhar Armony, a partner at Charles River Ventures, would say, “I think that Nathan is on to something really good and important. We share a common vision of thinking of [intellectual property] as an emerging asset class.”

The appeal is twofold: the opportunity to interact with a diverse group of thinkers purely for the sake of invention, and the efficiency with which IV translates imagination into intellectual capital.

Dennis Rivet, on working at Nathan Myhrvold’s Intellectual Ventures, which started as aPatent Defense Fund against trolls: BW 2006.

Bruce Sanford and Bruce Brown commented in the WSJ on “Google and the Copyright Wars” (11/12). Many are focused on the status of orphan works in the Google Books project, but Sanford and Brown argue that the idea of fair use and its application by search engines is the controversy’s center, not orphan works. Sanford and Brown would say that a search engine’s use of the web’s content is definite and definitely unfair.

Fair use of a book’s content, a website, or even the news underpins a search engine’s ability to find and deliver websites to users of the internet. Sanford and Brown stake out a position for search engines that is similar to a public library. Just as a library can employ the contents of its archive to establish an index for its patrons, the search engine uses the contents of the internet to establish an index for anyone at all. Sanford and Brown, however, contend that search engines are not libraries, so fair use does not apply.

Sanford and Brown argue that two distinctions separate search engines from the library model. Search engines not only copy text, they reproduce it in their results as snippets. Rights of reproduction are protected for copyright holders. Second, search engines sell advertising, and the sale of advertising is contingent on their ability to copy, store and reproduce copyrighted material. These distinctions, argue Sanford and Brown, disqualify search engines from the safe harbor of any exemption made for libraries. Their remedy: legislation.

The problem is, search engines don’t find safe harbor in the library model, and legislation is not the answer. Yes, a library applies fair use in its practices, and search engines have been compared to them in the past, but not all applications of fair use are found in the confines a library. This may be why they are so quick to demand legislation to expand copyright, even though expanding copyright may drive more business to the lawyers who protect it than the websites involved.

The Ninth Circuit court framed a four factor test for fair use in the case of Perfect 10 v. Google, et al in May 2007. The test would distinguish between copyright infringement and fair use in the case of Google’s use of Perfect 10 material in its search results. The four factors comprise: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the work, ie fact-based or creative; the amount of the work used; and the effect on the market for the work. None of them invoke the metaphor of the library used by Sanford and Brown.

When Google displayed the Perfect 10 images, the Circuit determined that all four factors weigh in its favor. The images may have been highly original, but the results incorporate “an original work into a new work, namely an electronic reference tool,” and this is highly transformative: “a search engine may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.” Though Google would use a degraded thumbnail version of the image, its “use of the entire photographic image [is] reasonable in light of the purpose of a search engine.” The Ninth Circuit, therefore, reasoned that Google’s use of Perfect 10 thumbnails would be considered fair use. Though it didn’t provide a decision, it did suffice to vacate Perfect 10’s preliminary injunction against Google.

Sanford and Brown mistake the metaphor of a library as the only example of fair use when alternatives, such as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, are perfectly acceptable. Perhaps this is why, having fleshed out their metaphor, they seize on legislation as a solution. Indeed, they would have Congress assert, “once the cache is monetized for the benefit of a search engine, the line of copyright infringement is crossed.” Isn’t this a sort of Hail Mary pass to rights-holders?
Legislation could make it illegal to monetize a cache without permission, but it’s not the panacea that Sanford and Brown are driving at. If the legislation mandated payments for rights-holders, it would, but this is probably not a suggestion that would be found in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. More likely, it would not, and it would leave websites in the position of the prisoner’s dilemma. If everyone cooperates and insists on payment, it will be to their mutual advantage, but the search engines direct so much traffic that each website has an incentive to break ranks; hence, everyone reluctantly opts in for fear that they’ll be the lone hold-out. In effect, it’s as though the legislation never happened, with one important distinction: there’s a new law on the books that requires a few good lawyers to understand. Perhaps that’s what’s really driving Sanford and Brown’s comment.

There is an exception, however. Not all players are equal in this game. Some may wager that holding-out is viable regardless of legislation or whether others do. That’s exactly what News Corp has done. They have begun negotiating a possible payment from Microsoft for the exclusive right to index their content. Though derided by many on the internet, should they find an agreement, their example will prove an important experiment in the question of paying for content.

[The portals] have made assumptions about using our content which are wrong, and we are prepared to demand appropriate compensation.

—Tom Curley, President and CEO of the AP, which now comprises 1400 member newspapers, and former publisher of Gannett’s USA Today: via WSJ

This is about what content providers must do in the digital era. That starts with doing a much better job of protecting the content we create

Tom Curley, AP: via FT

Thomson Reuters and other news agencies have begun working with third-party content identification firms such as Attributor to track the flow of their material across blogs, websites and aggregators. [FT] Any time you talk about a tracking system, the thrust of [the commentary] is about enforcing copyright. But what we hope is the outcome out of this is the ability to enable more licensed uses of  content. We want to keep the content open, we don’t want to keep it behind firewalls.

Jim Kennedy, the AP’s VP of strategic planning: All Things D

What we are building here is a way for good journalism to survive and thrive. The AP news registry will allow our industry to protect its content online, and will assure that we can continue to provide original, independent and authoritative journalism at a time when the world needs it more than ever.

Dean Singleton, chairman of the AP Board of Directors and vice chairman and CEO of Media News Group Inc, Fair Syndication Consortium and Attributor: via World Editors Forum

Nice container. Because they need it to protect such impressive stories as this.

[The portals] have made assumptions about using our content which are wrong, and we are prepared to demand appropriate compensation.
WSJ: Tom Curley, President and CEO of the AP, which now comprises 1400 member newspapers, and former publisher of Gannett’s USA Today

This is about what content providers must do in the digital era. That starts with doing a much better job of protecting the content we create
FT: Tom Curley.

AP, Thomson Reuters and other news agencies have begun working with third-party content identification firms such as Attributor to track the flow of their material across blogs, websites and aggregators. [FT]

Any time you talk about a tracking system, the thrust of [the commentary] is about enforcing copyright. But what we hope is the outcome out of this is the ability to enable more licensed uses of content. We want to keep the content open, we don’t want to keep it behind firewalls.
All Things D: Jim Kennedy, the AP’s VP of strategic planning

What we are building here is a way for good journalism to survive and thrive. The AP news registry will allow our industry to protect its content online, and will assure that we can continue to provide original, independent and authoritative journalism at a time when the world needs it more than ever.
World Editors Forum Dean Singleton, chairman of the AP Board of Directors and vice chairman and CEO of MediaNews Group Inc

Fair Syndication Consortium and Attributor

SAI reporting characterizing the Linkedin deal

Is this when banks become glass boxes and retail spaces?

The early eighties saw dramatic changes in the banking regulatory environment. These changes fundamentally re-oriented the rules and competition within the banking system. Two bills started the process, which would continue throughout the eighties and into the nineties. As one would expect, they emerged out of a deepening crisis.

DIDMCA in 1980 and Garn-St Germain in 1982 responded to the high-interest rate environment that had exposed and exacerbated competitive disadvantages at the community bank and S&L level that stemmed from the existing regulatory framework. The legislative answer, in the form of DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain shifted bank’s focus to financial products and opened the competition across state lines. The result was a shift in mind-set. Banks became two things. First, they became retail institutions designed to sell increasingly complicated financial services. Second, they also took on the ability to hold and manage increasingly risky assets. Both got them into trouble, but the shift to a retail mind-set is what changed the architecture of the bank.

Banks had been institutions defined by their place and designed to hold your money in a limited and regulated set of products. Banking institutions had been more like farms than those we regard today. Their business was tied to the fact that they were a physical part of the region. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 intentionally obstructed the development of national banks. Their financial services were regulated, and they competed for customers based on the fact that they were close. These banks, coddled by a stable regulatory structure, remained largely unchallenged by competing institutions and cultivated the architecture of safety.

The high interest-rate environment of the early eighties strained the regional banks and forced legislators to respond. Banking regulations had put community banks and S&Ls at a competitive disadvantage. Interest rates were regulated and had not kept pace with the high interest-rate environment ushered in by Volcker’s Federal Reserve. As a result, they were losing deposits, and the banking system was in turmoil.

The DIDMCA focused on establishing equality among financial services institutions, so it would level the competitive field. It removed interest rate caps on deposits for community banks by phasing out Regulation Q, so they could compete with money market funds and provide market rates. Thrifts were allowed to enter the consumer loan and credit card business. The bill provided a consistent framework for reserve requirements that would be managed by the Federal Reserve as an instrument of monetary policy. It also raised the FDIC insurance levels to $100k, which William Isaac later claimed, with Fernand St Germain, was a mistake. Banks started on a trajectory from being a place to keep your money to a place for accessing money-services on the open market.

The crisis did not abate. The economy was in a major recession. Paul Volcker had raised interest rates to unimaginable levels. The thrift industry was in crisis, and congress came to the rescue in two ways. First, it accelerated the deregulation of banks and S&Ls, so they could improve their business. Second, it interceded with insolvent banks through direct funding and opening the possibility of non-regional and interstate acquisitions of banks.

The deregulation of the banking industry introduced a tectonic shift in banking. Banks would grow into financial supermarkets of services. Services, such as interest rates, which had been regulated, became competitive and subject to active management. These new abilities would enable banks to become aggressive producers and managers of capital. This was evident in many respects. The bill accelerated the abolition of remaining Regulation Q differentials between banks and thrifts, which governed maximum allowable rates on deposit accounts. S&Ls and savings banks gained the power to invest up to 5% of their assets in commercial loans. Up to 30% of an S&L’s assets could be invested in consumer loans, and they also could invest in state and local government bonds. In a high interest rate environment, this accrued to their benefit by making their deposits more competitive, improving the returns on their deposits, and perhaps improving net interest margins. Garn-St Germain also de-regulated real-estate loans, removing statutory restriction on real estate loans for national banks, and preempted state regulation that would adversely affect the activities of a national bank.

Garn-St Germain convened a spectrum of solutions for failing institutions. The Federal Savings and Loan insurance Corporation (FSLIC) introduced the concept of net worth certificates. These would be purchased by the FSLIC, counted as regulatory capital, and provide for the ongoing operation of the bank as a solvent entity. The legislation authorized the FDIC to bless interstate banking acquisitions of closed savings or commercial banks with assets over $500m, and similar powers were granted to the FSLIC. Both the McFadden Act of 1927 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 had been designed to obstruct the development of an interstate banking system by devolving regulatory responsibility to the states, leaving no consistent national regulatory fabric. The FDIC’s new powers were a direct challenge to 50+ years of banking practices that defined banks and financial services in terms of place, not product. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 would later make these changes permanent and pervasive. DIDMCA and Garn-St Germain shifted banks’ focus to products, and place, though still important, was no longer integral of the bank’s identity. Later regulation, such as CEBA, would compound and expand these changes.

The rising metaphor for banking became the retail store. The architecture of safety was for institutions that were rooted in the region and frozen in the regulatory structures that came out of the market crash and depression. The emphasis was safety, the product mix was simple and regulated, and banks looked more like traditional, quasi-state institutions. The changes in the early eighties forced banks to expand the financial services they provided and provide them just like retail stores. These were new, highly variable, and very competitive. It’s not for nothing that Garn-St. Germain included the initial Truth in Lending provisions. The new services at the local bank level required marketing support and additional education. A teller didn’t have to give their client a toaster to stand out. With Regulation Q retired, they could offer a more competitive interest rate. These dynamics are more typically associated with consumer goods, and the architecture changed to suit them, promote them, and grow the business. Retail banking begins, and with it, glass boxes and retail spaces find themselves occupied by the former tenants of the traditional and staid – banks.

Out of region and out of state competitors begin to spring up. They’ve acquired failed banks or otherwise joined the market. The new branches are designed to sell financial services and projected into new markets. They’re designed to be retail stores for financial services. Banks find that they can quickly open “new doors,” as they might say in the retail industry, and these doors are the source of new deposits and sale of loans, accounts, et al.

One question that emerges is, if the front end of banks begins to shift into retail and change its relationships with its customers, how does the back end change? How do banks change their relationship to the supply of money? The legacy of the local bank had been deposits funded by a local depositor base and lent to the local depositor base according to strict capital requirements. What happens as the community banks and S&Ls gain direct exposure to the capital markets? One answer is Liar’s Poker.

A friend recently directed me to an argument that flared up between Graham Hill and Doc Searls on the subject of Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) and Doc Searls’ VRM Project. Graham’s critique is essentially existential. He claims that VRM can’t exist, and if it does exist, it’s irrelevant and a giant step back for commerce and the consumer.

Graham makes a compelling case by dint of its organization. He outlines a dichotomy between CRM and VRM. Either customers own the data or companies own the data. If customers own the data, it would be subject to four claims. And he strings up VRM as a straw man to be invariably dismissed. Unfortunately, the dichotomy is false and the claims don’t match subject — VRM.

But that’s not so much the issue. Instead, it reveals two implicit claims: consumers have no interest in their consumption; consumers and their vendors would not benefit from the tools to organize and act on that interest.

Let’s start with the dichotomy – the existential question. Is VRM impossible?

Rather than companies owning huge databases of customer transaction data which they can mine for their own advantage, customers should take control of their own transaction data and selectively release it to companies when they want something from them.

For a customer to take control of their own transaction data doesn’t require companies to give up control. Isn’t this what ERP systems do when they manage and help negotiate with suppliers? That relieves us of the either/or. Lo — VRM can exist, and it can exist if we have the tools to harvest transaction data, understand it and act on it.

Moving to the fallacies. First, the data is already out there. I receive credit card statements, mobile phone bills, and other statements that give me the data. Second, of course people want control of the marketing sent to them. Does that mean that they don’t want the transaction data? No. Third and fourth, these arguments could be parsed as non sequiturs, bundled in a false dichotomy and finished by begging the question.

Starting with the position that VRM can’t exist, Graham proceeds to say, if it were to exist, it wouldn’t have access to data. If it did have access to data, people wouldn’t want it. And if VRM cleared these hurdles, it would do nothing less than attempt to supplant the free market system by way of managed markets and the principled dissolution of Apple as we know it.

The distillation proves extreme, but it’s revealing. It uncovers the two claims driving Graham’s post: consumers have no interest in their consumption; consumers and their vendors would not benefit from the tools to organize and act on that interest. VRM is a bet that these are both false. If they are, there’s interest and an economy, and that could be a business.

First, consumption. People are passionate, particular, and opinionated about the stuff they buy. We call those people enthusiasts, and we can find them in the Makers Mark Ambassadors program, Ducati owner groups, and even fanboy sites for the media they consume. They might obsess over any one step in the process: finding, acquiring, managing or consuming — or, all of the above. But people are interested in their consumption.

Second, organization, or VRM. Consumers benefit from tools to manage their vendors. Cellartracker.com comes to mind, and the Mint / Wasabi effort looks like an early attempt to better understand spending through parsing credit card data. The problem with these is that they may or may not make money.

So yes, the bet is right, but the question remains: does it make money?

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